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EX ANTE CHOICE OF JURY WAIVER CLAUSES IN MERGERS 
 




This paper examines empirically why sophisticated parties in some merger and 
acquisition deals choose to waive their right to jury trials and some do not. We examine 
merger agreements for a large sample of 276 deals for the 11-year period 2001 to 2011. 
We exclude private company deals and those where the choice of forum and law is 
Delaware.  First, we find that 48.2% of the deals have jury waiver clauses. Second, we 
find that deals in which New York is chosen as the governing law and forum state are 
more likely to include a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an effect. Third, we 
find that contracts negotiated by counsel from high reputation law firms tend to include 
jury waiver clauses, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer’s law firm than for 
the target’s law firm. Fourth, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power 
hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to 
include jury waiver clauses. Finally, we find no evidence that lawyer familiarity, 
industry-effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or whether the deal was 
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Legal scholars have long recognized that contracts should maximize the joint 
gains or contractual surplus from transactions between parties. In doing so, contracts 
should satisfy being ex post trade efficient (trade occurs only when value to the buyer 
exceeds value to the seller), and being ex ante investment efficient in the subject matter 
of the contract (Schwartz & Scott 2003). Contracting parties can enhance the ex ante 
efficiency of their contract by shifting contracting costs between the front end of the 
transaction (the negotiation and drafting stage) and the back end (the contract 
enforcement and litigation stage) (Scott & Triantis 2006). For example, a clause that 
waives the parties’ right to a jury trial should litigation result reduces back end 
enforcement costs (by reducing the time and expense of a trial as well as errors made by 
inexperienced juries) and transfers corresponding contracting costs to the front end of the 
transaction (where the parties must negotiate such an agreement). Theory predicts that 
sophisticated parties will agree to such clauses when the savings in expected enforcement 
costs exceed the additional costs of negotiation and drafting. Any efficiency gains from 
jury waiver clauses would depend, inter alia, on the relative complexity of the contract:  
ceteris paribus, the more complex the factual context, the more cost savings might be 
realized from a jury waiver.  
 
But jury waiver clauses may also have distributional as well as efficiency effects.  
For example, some parties may believe that they have an advantage over others in 
persuading a jury rather than a judge of the merits of their claim.1  This advantage might 
be particularly true, for example, for firms located in the forum from which the jury pool 
is drawn.  As a consequence, a party may resist agreeing to an efficiency enhancing jury 
waiver clause if its expected share of any efficiency gains are less than that its expected 
gain from exploiting its litigation advantage. Additionally, firms might draft jury waiver 
clauses because substantial ex post litigation costs might have to be incurred because 
                                                 






juries have difficulties interpreting vague terms such as “reasonable best efforts” or 
“material adverse changes” which could lead to large errors (Choi & Triantis 2010).   
 
Given the possible offsetting effects of jury waiver clauses in particular contexts, 
one would predict that some contracts would contain jury waiver clauses and others 
would not.  This paper examines the variation in the use of jury waiver clauses in merger 
and acquisition agreements.2 The agreement between target and acquirer firms to waive 
the right to a jury is one means of reducing expected litigation costs in large complex 
commercial contracts such as merger agreements. In addition to the expected reduction in 
litigation costs of having a bench trial rather than a jury trial, data show that many 
corporate managers and business lawyers believe that juries increase variance in trial 
outcomes because jurors do not fully take into account the evidence and applicable law 
(Lande 1998). Juries are also often been viewed as less technically sophisticated and 
legally knowledgeable than judges, and are believed to be often swayed by extrinsic 
factors that can lead to larger errors and arbitrary awards.3  
 
 This study examines a large sample of 276 publicly traded deals4 over an 11-year 
period (2001 to 2011) to determine the factors that explain the ex ante choice to include a 
jury waiver clause in a merger and acquisition deal. In an interesting inaugural study, 
Eisenberg and Miller (EM) examined jury trial waivers for 11 different types of 
commercial contracts for the six month period January 2002 to June 2002 (Eisenberg & 
                                                 
2 For an excellent explanation of other merger and acquisition contract characteristics, see Coates, 2015. 
  
3 For example, jurors might suffer more from behavioral cognitive biases (Sunstein et. al, 2002); Ellsworth, 
1993); Lebine & Lebine1996); Jurors might also make moral judgments about the conduct of particular 
parties and the size of the requested damages award (Sunstein et al, 2002), (Chapman & Bornsetin, 1996). 
Jurors might also be affected by the appearance of the parties and personality of the lawyers (Harris, et al 
2006), (MacCoun, 1990). Juries might also place too much emphasis on expert testimony and when the 
expert testifies in more technical terms (Raitz, et al.1990), (Horowitz, et al. 2001).  
 
4 Publicly traded deals are defined as those where both the acquirer and the target firm are traded in U.S. 
capital markets. 





Miller 2007).5  EM found that jury trial waivers were more likely with greater contract 
standardization, perceived fairness of juries, and by contract type. In their conclusion, 
EM state: 
We are mindful … this is the first study of its kind and it is important to recognize 
its limitations. The contracts we study exist in a narrow time period. Ideally, we 
would like information for periods before and after the first half of 2002. The 
variation across contract types in the rates of jury trial waiver also suggests that 
more information and more sophisticated modeling of the decision to include 
waivers would be fruitful. The details of the relations between the contracting 
parties and the motivations of those drafting the clauses should be studied.6 
 
We address EM’s concerns and extend their study by a) examining a large sample 
that starts in January 2001 and ends in December 2011; b) analyzing merger agreements 
only,7 in order to overcome the heterogeneity problem in the EM study;8 c) analyzing 
new hypotheses relating jury waiver clauses to the parties’ choice of governing law and 
choice of forum as well as characteristics of law firms representing both bidder and target 
firms (namely, their reputation and familiarity with each other); and d) analyzing whether 
bargaining power is related to the probability of a jury waiver clause in the agreement. In 
doing so, we exclude all mergers that chose Delaware as their state of governing law and 
forum, given that the Delaware Chancery Court sits always without a jury. We also 
                                                 
5 For mergers their sample ended in July 2002. 
 
6  Id at 586-87. 
 
7 Merger contracts are highly negotiated, involve sophisticated parties, deal with large and material 
amounts, and are very enforceable. Litigation in this context is likely to be standardized about deal price, 
with litigation consisting of derivative suits involving whether the deal price is too high or too low, and 
whether the acquirer did not ‘close on the deal’. 
 
8 The contracts in the Eisenberg and Miller (2007) study include agreements involving asset sales, bond 
indentures, credit commitments, employment, licensing, pooling and servicing, settlements, mergers and 
underwriting.  There is too much heterogeneity in these types of contracts to be captured by dummy 






ensure that our results are not driven by five other states that have similar Chancery 
courts, namely, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Tennessee.  
 
We find the following results. First, we find that jury waiver clauses are quite 
ubiquitous in merger and acquisition deals as 48.2% of them have jury waiver clauses.9 
Second, we find that deals in which New York is chosen as the governing law and forum 
state are more likely to include a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an effect. 
Third, we find that contracts negotiated by counsel from high reputation law firms tend to 
include jury waiver clauses, 10 and this effect is more significant for the acquirer’s law 
firm than for the target’s law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining 
power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely 
to include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that 
lawyer familiarity, industry effects whether the acquirer was an international firm, or 
whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of 
having a jury waiver clause.  
 
It is important to note that our results are based on correlations between 
quantifiable variables using Probit regression analysis. In no way are we attributing our 
results to some form of causal claim. In order to do so, we need to identify an exogenous 
shock that was not expected by the various participants in the merger and acquisitions 
market place. Clearly, the choice of attorney, choice of jury waiver clause, choice of 
forum and law clause are endogenously determined. It is extremely hard, and one might 
also say close to impossible, to identify natural exogenous events which effect one choice 
                                                 
9 Using a larger sample, we find that jury waiver clauses correlate with higher announcement period stock 
returns for both  the target and the combined firm (Palia & Robert E. Scott, 2014).  The result that jury 
waiver clauses are beneficial and Pareto efficient for the combined firms is consistent with Eisenberg et. al, 
2006, and Eisenberg & Wells, 2006). 
 






variable and not another choice variable. That said, our empirical approach is consistent 
with all other studies that examine mergers and acquisitions using regression analysis.   
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our hypotheses and Section 3 
describes our data, empirical methodology, and variables.  Our empirical results are 
reported in Section 4, and conclusions presented in Section 5. 
 
2. Hypotheses  
 In this section we construct hypotheses that correlate with the probability of the 
merger deal having a jury waiver clause.  
 
2.1 Choice of Forum and Choice of Law 
Merging firms that choose a state for dispute resolution opt into a judicial system, 
a cohort of judges and a jury pool. They accomplish this by negotiating a choice of forum 
clause.  If the merging firms believe a state’s judges are experienced and knowledgeable 
when compared to other states, they will tend to choose that state as the forum for any 
litigation over the contract and will more likely negotiate for a jury waiver clause. 
Additionally, if the merging firms believe that the chosen state’s jury pool is fair and 
balanced, as compared to other states they will be less likely to negotiate a jury waiver 
(Eisenberg & Miller 2007a, Cain & Davidoff 2012).  
 
The choice of using a jury rather than a judge to decide the facts may be 
influenced by the extent to which the jury will be required to evaluate evidence of the 
meaning of the agreement from sources extrinsic to the written agreement.  Here the 
choice of forum can also implicate the parties’ option to choose the rules of contract 
interpretation that will govern contract disputes. A choice of law clause in a merger 
agreement is typically paired with the choice of forum provision in a single contract term 





source of governing law. 11 Choices of law clauses permit parties to select either 
“textualist” or “contextualist” rules of interpretation. Textualist jurisdictions, such as 
New York, use a “hard” parol evidence rule that gives presumptively conclusive effect to 
merger or integration clauses, and, in their absence, presume that the contract is fully 
integrated if it appears final and complete on its face.12  In the same spirit, the textualist 
approach bars context evidence suggesting that parties intended to impart non-standard 
meaning to language that, read alone, is unambiguous.13  From the textualist perspective, 
therefore, the parol evidence and plain meaning rules are tools with which the contracting 
parties can control the evidence courts will use to interpret the portion of their agreement 
that they intend to make legally enforceable. Contextualist jurisdictions, such as 
California,14 reject the notion that words in a contract can have a plain or unambiguous—
context free—meaning at all.  By the same logic they favor a soft parol evidence rule. 
Here the test for integration admits extrinsic evidence notwithstanding an unambiguous 
merger clause declaring the contract to be an integrated writing or, absent such a clause, 
                                                 
11 The typical merger agreement contains both choice of forum and choice of law provisions, most often 
combined in a single contract term.  See e.g. Agreement and Plan of Merger and Reorganization among 
Chordiant Software, Inc., Puccini Acquisition Corp., and Prime Response, Inc. , January 8, 2001. 
9.5 Applicable Law: Jurisdiction.  This agreement shall be governed by, and construed in 
accordance with, the laws of the State of Delaware, regardless of the laws that might otherwise 
govern under applicable principles of conflicts of laws thereof.  In any action between any of the 
parties arising out of or relating to the Agreement: (a) each of the parties irrevocably and 
unconditionally consents and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the state and 
federal courts located in the state of Delaware… 
A random search in our sample of merger agreements yielded only five agreements where the choice of 
forum and choice of law terms appeared as separate terms of the contract.  In each of the five cases, the 
agreements identified the same state as the forum state and the source of governing law. 
 
12See, e.g., Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (App. Div. 1991) (“Parol 
evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract containing a merger clause.”) 
 
13 The plain meaning rule addresses the question of what legal meaning should be attributed to the contract 
terms that the parol evidence rule has identified.  As with the division over hard and soft parol evidence 
rules, courts have divided on the question whether express contract terms should be given a contextual or a 
plain meaning interpretation.  Under the latter practice, when words or phrases appear to be unambiguous, 
extrinsic evidence of a possible contrary meaning is inadmissible (Schwartz & Scott 2010). 
 
14 Other states that have contextualist jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Michigan, New Jersey, 






notwithstanding the fact that the writing appears final and complete on its face.15  Courts 
in California regard the merger clause as merely creating a rebuttable presumption of 
integration that can be overridden by extrinsic evidence that the parties lacked any such 
intent.   
Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses vary with the forum state and with the choice of law 
for contract interpretation. 
 
2.2 Attorney familiarity 
If attorneys for both the target and acquirer firm are from the same state, they 
might be more familiar with relevant state law and with each other.  As a consequence of 
the pre-existing relationship of their representatives, the merging firms may be less likely 
to litigate their disagreements and more likely to settle (Klausner 1995, Kahan & Klausner 
1997, Johnston & Waldfogel 2002). Settlement may be easier to achieve in a bench trial 
rather than a jury trial as the variance in the parties’ estimation of their case is smaller in 
the former case. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Jury waiver clauses will be more prevalent in deals where the 
attorneys are from the same state. 
 
Additionally, it seems reasonable that local attorneys might expect a local jury to 
favor it over non-local counterparties. For example, an attorney from the same state as the 
where the firm is headquartered might prefer a jury from that state for beneficial jurisdiction 
over a non-local attorney.  
 
Hypothesis 2.2(b): Jury waiver clauses will be more prevalent in deals where the 
attorneys and the firm’s headquarters are from the same state. 
                                                 
15 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (1968) 
(“[R]ational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered 








2.3 Attorney reputation 
Attorneys associated in a law firm with a high reputation for legal skill and 
experience  are likely to be more confident in their ability to negotiate merger deals that 
are favorable to their clients’ interests.  To protect the advantage that they anticipate 
being able to secure in negotiating the terms of the merger agreement, they would prefer 
to have the case litigated before a judge rather than a jury.  A judge’s superior 
understanding of legal issues increases the probability that any advantage gained through 
negotiating a (clearly written) agreement would be sustained in court.  As noted above, 
juries increase the variance in outcomes and in making significantly costly errors thus 
reducing marginally any advantage secured in the merger negotiations. Additionally, 
more skilled and experienced attorneys are also more likely to be familiar with the 
jurisdictional divide between textualist and contextualist styles of contract interpretation 
and as a consequence cognizant of the expected efficiency gains from choosing to litigate 
in a textualist state.  Both of these theories would present similarly in the desire to 
negotiate a jury waiver clause.16 
 
Hypothesis 2.3: Jury waiver clauses will increase with law firm reputation.  
                                                 
16 Some papers have shown that lawyer reputation is important. In a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
game, Gilson & Mnookin, 1994 suggest that clients can use lawyers with strong reputation to credibly 
signal to the other side that they are cooperative; in an experimental setting, Croson and Mnookin, 1997 
finds supporting evidence that principals will choose agents that sustain more cooperation than on their 
own; Gilson, 1984 suggests that business lawyers create value by being transaction cost engineers that 
increase the market value of their clients’ transactions; Okamoto, 1995 suggests that law firm reputation is 
a credible bond or commitment device in the form of a legal opinion being made on behalf of the client 
firm; Krishnan & Masulis, 2013 find that top law firms increase the takeover premium for their client firms, 
top bidder law firms have higher completion rates and top target law firms have higher withdrawal  rates; 
Coates 2012), finds that law firms with more M&A experience but less private target firm experience are 
less likely to choose Delaware as the forum for dispute resolution, whereas firm with less M&A experience 
omit forum selection clauses; and Krishnan, et al, 2013 find that top law firms representing both bidders 






One might argue that transactional attorneys who are in partnership with high 
reputation litigation specialists might be confident of their colleagues’ superior ability 
relative to opposing counsel to persuade a jury pool of the merits of their claim and 
would therefore prefer litigating in front of a jury. But this argument is likely to be 
unsupported by the facts because jury waiver clauses are designed by the merger 
transaction lawyer and not by the litigation specialist (who is brought into the deal only if 
there is a conflict between parties).17 
 
2.4 Bargaining power 
 Contracts are often based on the bargaining power of the parties involved. If both 
the acquirer and the target firm are of the same size they might a priori believe that they 
have been fairly represented in merger negotiations. On the other hand, if for example, 
the acquirer is of a larger size and consequently has greater bargaining power, such 
acquirers might insists that the smaller target firm waive its right to a jury trial.  
 
Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will be more frequent when the bidding firm is of a 
much larger size than the target firm.  
 
2.5 International acquiring firms  
Some studies have found that international firms prefer arbitration to litigation 
(Eisenberg & Miller 2007b). To the extent that this preference reflects a reluctance to rely 
on non-expert juries to resolve commercial disputes, the fact that the acquiring firm is 
unfamiliar with and uneasy about relying on U.S. juries should be positively correlated 
with the frequency of jury waiver clauses in the merger agreement.  
 
                                                 
17 Additionally, the Vault litigation and merger rankings are given for only for a small sample of law firms. 
For example, litigation rankings are given for only five law firms, the merger rankings for 10 law firms, 






Hypothesis: Jury waiver clauses will be more frequent when the bidding firm is an 
international acquirer that is traded in the U.S. capital markets.  
 
3. Data, Methodology, and Variables 
3.1 Data  
We begin creating our sample of merger and acquisition deals by examining 
Thomson Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Domestic Merger Database from January 
2000 through December 2011. This resulted in 109,098 observations. We dropped any 
transactions where we could not obtain stock return data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). This resulted in an initial sample of 8,488 observations. We then 
dropped transactions wherein the target company’s name was the same as the acquirer 
company’s name as in the case of exchange offers between two classes of stock and stock 
buybacks (6,681 observations), if the transaction did not involve a merger as in equity 
carve outs, loan modifications and   recapitalization (281 observations), if we could not 
find a merger agreement filed as an exhibit in SEC Form 8-K filing from the SEC’s 
Edgar database (351 observations) and where market value could not be calculated from 
CRSP before the merger due to missing data (28 observations).18 Because we did not 
want our results to being driven by mergers that chose Delaware as the state of forum we 
removed such mergers (603 observations). Our final sample for analysis consists of 276 




3.2 Definitions and sources for variables 
 Our dependent variable is if the deal had a jury waiver clause, or not. We 
manually examined merger agreements to collect this variable. We also collected data 
from the merger agreements on whether the deal had an arbitration clause. There were 
                                                 






very few mergers with arbitration clauses (seven mergers), so we categorized is it as a 
jury waiver clause.19  
 
We describe below the definition, construction and data source for the various 
independent variables used in our regression (see Table 2 for a summary). We examined 
the merger agreements for choice of forum and choice of law. If the merger agreement 
gave New York as the choice of forum and law we set a dummy variable Forum-NY to 
unity, and zero otherwise.  If the merger agreement gave the following 10 states (namely, 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas, 
Vermont and Washington) as the choice of forum and law, we set a dummy variable 
Forum-restrictive to unity, and zero otherwise.  For deals in which the choice of forum 
and law are for states that are not from the above 11 states, we set the dummy variables 




  In order to get proxy variables for the acquirers and bidders law firm reputation, 
we use three definitions of law firm reputation. The first proxy variable for law firm 
reputation is based on the idea that more reputable lawyers can charge higher fees. 
Accordingly, we use as our independent variable the dollar profits per partner for the top 
200 law firms. This data is obtained for each year from the Am Law 200 series provided 
by ALM Legal Intelligence. We define A_reputation_PPP as the law firm rank based on 
profits per partner (in $millions) for the acquiring firm’s lawyer. Similarly, we define 
T_reputation_PPP as the law firm rank based on profits per partner (in $millions) for the 
target firm’s lawyer. If the law firm is not listed in the top 200, we give it a rank 201.20 
                                                 
19 None of our results significantly change if we removed these mergers from our analysis. 
20 When the rank of the bidder’s or the target’s law firm was not listed in the top 100, we also set dummy 
variables equal to unity, and A_reputation_Vault and T_reputation_Vault to zero. Our results did not 
significantly change, suggesting that law firm rank of the non-listed firm is not driving our law firm 





Note that a lower number for both A_reputation_PPP and/or T_reputation_PPP indicates 
a more reputable law firm.  
 
Our second proxy variable for law firm reputation is the prestige rank of the law 
firm by Vault. The top 100 law firms are ranked by Vault each year. We define 
A_reputation_Vault (T_reputation_Vault), as the law firm rank based on Vault for the 
acquiring (target) firm’s lawyer, respectively. If the law firm is not listed in the top 100, 
we give it a rank 101. Our third proxy variable for law firm reputation, is 
A_reputation_NY, and is a dummy variable set to unity if the acquiring firm’s lawyer is 
from New York. A similar variable, T_reputation_NY is set to unity if the target firm’s 
lawyer is from New York.  
 
To examine the attorney familiarity hypothesis, we examined the merger 
agreements and created a dummy variable Lawyer-familiarity, if attorneys for both the 
target and acquirer are from the same state, and zero otherwise.  To examine if an 
attorney from the same state as the where the firm is headquartered might prefer a jury 
from that state for beneficial jurisdiction over a non-local attorney, we create two dummy 
variables. The first dummy variable, A_HQ-lawyer familiarity, is set to unity if the 
acquiring firm’s headquarters and their attorney is from the same state, and zero 
otherwise. The second dummy variable, T_HQ-lawyer familiarity, is set to unity if the 
target firm’s headquarters and their attorney is from the same state, and zero otherwise. 
 
To examine the bargaining power hypothesis, we need to calculate the relative 
size of the merging firms.  In order to calculate this variable, we define the variable 
Relative size to be the natural logarithm of the market value of the target firm less the 
natural logarithm of the market value of the bidder firm. These market values are 
calculated from CRSP on the last day of the estimation period (t =-60).21   
                                                 






We define a dummy variable A_international which is set to unity if SDC states 
that the acquirer is an international bidder. For US bidders A_international is set to zero. 
We also include a number of control variables. The first is a dummy variable, Completed, 
that is set to unity if the deal was completed, and zero otherwise. We also include 18 
dummy variables, nine for acquirers and nine for target firms to control for the industry 
of each firm. We use the firm’s four-digit SIC code to map into the 10 Fama-French 
industries.22  The nine dummy variables for acquirers are:  A_cons_nondur which is set to 
unity for consumer nondurables (food, tobacco, textiles apparel, leather and toys), and 
zero otherwise; A_cons_dur which set to unity for consumer durables (cars, tv’s, furniture, 
household appliances), and zero otherwise; A_manuf which is set to unity for 
manufacturing industries, and zero otherwise;  A_energy which is set to unity for the oil, 
gas and coal  industries, and zero otherwise; A_high_tech which is set to unity for high 
technology companies, and zero otherwise; Telecom which is set to unity for the 
television and transmission industries, and zero otherwise; A_shops which is set to unity 
for wholesale and retail shops, and zero otherwise; A_health which is set to unity for the 
healthcare industry, and zero otherwise; and A_utilities which is set to unity for the 
utilities industry, and zero otherwise. All other industries are set to zero in the above nine 
industry variables. A similar algorithm is implemented for target industries, with each 
industry name beginning with T_ instead.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
We begin by documenting the incidence of jury waiver and arbitration clauses in 
our sample. We find that jury waiver clauses are quite ubiquitous in the merger 
agreements, with 133 out of 276 (48.2%) having a jury waiver clause. In Table 3, we 
present the descriptive statistics of the independent variables that we will use in our 
regression. 
                                                 








We find that the choice of New York as the state of law and forum to be  25% (68 
mergers out of 276) in our sample, and the 10 restrictive states that allow contextual 
interpretation to be 17% (47 mergers out of 276). We also find that the acquiring (target) 
firm’s lawyers to have an average rank based on profits per partner of 101.9 (115.3), 
respectively, out of a maximum rank of 201. Similarly, we find that the acquiring (target) 
firm’s lawyers to have an average rank based on Vault of 63.9 (69.1), respectively, out of 
a maximum rank of 101. New York based law firms are on average more heavily 
represented for acquirers (31%) than for target firms (18%).  
 
We find that 32% or 88 out of 276 mergers have lawyers from the same state, 
with the median mergers having lawyers from different states. 84% of the mergers have 
the lawyer of the acquiring firm from the same state as where the bidder firm is 
headquartered, and 73% of the mergers have the lawyer of the target firm from the same 
state as where the target firm is headquartered.  
 
When we examine the relative size of the two merging firms, we find that the 
average target firm is 11.4% of the market capitalization of the bidder firm.  We find that 
6% of our mergers involved an acquirer that was an international firm that is traded in the 
U.S. capital markets. Most of our sample (91%) involve deals that were completed. When 
we examine the various industries bidders are from, we find more bidders from high-
technology and health industries. We also find target firms to be more concentrated in 
manufacturing, high-technology and health industries.23  
 
4.2 Determinants of jury waiver clauses 
Table 4 presents the Spearman correlation coefficients between the lawyer 
reputation variables. All the correlations are significant at the one percent level of 
                                                 





significance. Given that the first two proxy variables, are ranks based on profits per 
partner and Vault, they are highly positively correlated; 0.86 for acquirers and 0.82 for 
targets, respectively. New York law firms are found to have a higher rank (a lower value 
denoting a higher rank; for example, the first ranked law firm gets the value one, the 
second ranked law firm gets the value two, and so on). Therefore New York law firms 
have a negative correlation with the other lawyer reputation variables. Given the high 




We now estimate a Probit model to determine the ex ante choice of merger 
partners to include a jury waiver clause in their merger agreement. In doing so, we 
include a comprehensive list of independent variables in our regression specification, the 
results of which are given in Table 5. In column (1), law firm reputation is proxied by the 
rank of the law firm based on profits per partner, in column (2) law firm reputation is 
proxied by the Vault rank of the law firm, and in column (3) whether the law firm is a 
New York law firm. Panel A presents the regression estimates and standard errors which 
are corrected using the Huber-White sandwich estimators that control for lack of 
normality and heteroscedasticity. For ease of explanation we do not provide the 
coefficients on the 18 industry dummy variables. It also turns out that they are not 
statistically significant.  In Panel B, we present the results of an F-test that the multiple 




When we examine the choice of forum and choice of law variables, we find that 
merger agreements that showed New York as the forum state and state of governing law 
had a higher likelihood of a jury waiver clause. When we examine the restrictive law 





all three specifications, but this relationship is statistically insignificant. An F-test shows 
that we can reject the null hypothesis that the forum state variables are jointly equal to 
zero.  
 
We next examine the lawyer reputation variable. In all three specifications, more 
reputable law firms of acquirers have a higher likelihood of including a jury waiver 
clause in the merger agreement. When the target law firm reputation variable is based on 
Vault rankings do more reputable law firms of targets have a higher likelihood of 
including a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement. An F-test shows that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the lawyer reputation variables are jointly equal to zero. 
These results support the argument that attorneys from more reputable law firms prefer to 
have jury waiver clauses in order to reduce the variance in outcomes and errors made by 
less knowledgeable juries (as compared to judges). The results are also against the 
argument that more reputable law firms prefer juries because they are more confident of 
their litigation skill.  
 
We find no evidence for the hypothesis that lawyer familiarity has a statistically 
significant impact on the probability of having a jury waiver clause in the merger 
agreement. These results show no support for lawyers from the same state, or lawyers 
that are from the same state where the firm is headquartered having a higher likelihood of 
a jury waiver clause. An F-test rejects the null hypothesis that lawyer familiarity has a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of having a jury waiver clause.  
 
We find strong evidence for the bargaining power hypothesis across all three 
regression specifications. A large acquirer taking over a small target firm (Relative size is 
low) generates a higher probability of having a jury waiver clause, or conversely, a 






We find no evidence that jury waiver clauses are more prevalent when the bidder 
is an international firm that is traded on the U.S. stock market. We also find that whether 
the deal was completed or not had a statistically insignificant effect on the likelihood of 
having a jury waiver clause. Finally, we find statistically insignificant industry effects 
that are jointly uncorrelated with the probability of having a jury waiver clause.  
 
We now construct a parsimonious model of the statistically significant variables 
that we found in Table 5, for modeling the choice of having a jury waiver clause. The 
results of this model are given in Table 6. Consistent with the results noted above, we 
find that merger partners who specify New York as the governing law and forum state, 
who are represented by high reputation law firms, and are unequal size merger partners, 
increase the probability of having a jury waiver clause. These results show strong support 




Although we removed all mergers wherein Delaware was chosen as the choice of 
forum and law, we examine whether other states have Chancery courts that sit without a 
jury. We find five other states that have such courts. These states are Arkansas, Illinois, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Tennessee, respectively. We find 14 mergers whose choice 
of forum and law is from these states. In Table 7, we repeat our regressions excluding 




In summary, we find that deals in which New York is chosen as the forum state 
and as governing law are more likely to have a jury waiver clause. No other state has 
such an effect. We also find that law firms that are more highly reputable are more likely 





firm than for the target’s law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining 
power hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely 
to include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that 
lawyer familiarity, industry effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or 
whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the probability of 
having a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines a large sample of 276 publicly traded deals over an 11-year 
period (2001 to 2011) to determine the ex ante choice to include a jury waiver clause in a 
merger and acquisition deal. We extend and improve on the EM study.  We find that jury 
waiver clauses are quite common in merger agreements with 48.2% (133) of the deals 
having such a clause.  
 
We find that deals in which New York is chosen as the forum state and as 
governing law are more likely to have a jury waiver clause. No other state has such an 
effect. We also find that law firms that are more highly reputable are more likely to 
include a jury waiver clause, and this effect is more significant for the acquirer’s law firm 
than for the target’s law firm. Finally, we find strong evidence for the bargaining power 
hypothesis wherein larger acquirers that take over smaller targets are more likely to 
include jury waiver clauses in their merger agreements. We also find no evidence that 
lawyer familiarity, industry effects, whether the acquirer was an international firm, or 
whether the deal was completed has a statistically significant impact on the probability of 
having a jury waiver clause in the merger agreement.  
 
The most significant finding is that jury waiver clauses are positvely correlated 
with the choice of New York as the governing law and New York as the forum state.  
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that parties choose jury waiver clauses 





interpretation disputes.  As noted above, New York follows the traditional, textualist 
approach to contract interpretation (Schwartz & Scott 2010).  Textualist interpretation 
permits legally sophisticated commercial parties to economize on contracting costs by 
shifting costs from the back end of the contracting process (the enforcement function) 
where a court would inquire broadly into context, to the front end of the contracting 
process (the negotiating and design function) where the parties specify the extent to 
which context will count.24 Parties can do this, for example, by drafting a merger clause 
that integrates their entire understanding, including relevant context, into the written 
contract and then having the court apply a plain meaning interpretation to those contract 
terms that are facially unambiguous.  Importantly, when parties fully integrate the 
agreement and use a merger clause, an interpretation dispute over contract terms may be 
resolved on summary judgment, thereby substantially reducing ex post enforcement costs 
(Schwartz & Scott 2010).  
 
The reduction in the chance of an expensive trial, in turn, reduces the settlement 
value of a claim, and therefore the incentive for a disappointed party to pursue 
opportunistic litigation in the first place.   
 
If instead a court decides to consider additional context evidence, it must 
necessarily deny a motion for summary judgment and set the case for full trial on the 
merits.  Thus, if litigation cost is considered, there is a strong argument that in cases 
where uncertainty is low and risks can be allocated in advance, many legally 
sophisticated commercial parties prefer textualist interpretation so that disputes can be 
resolved without the punishing costs of a full trial and the skewed incentives that derive 
from the anticipation of these costs (Schwartz & Scott 2010). Such parties will rationally 
                                                 
24For a discussion of how contracting parties can economize on total contracting costs by shifting costs 
between the drafting or front end of the contracting process and the adjudication or back end of the process, 






invest in sufficient drafting costs to insure that a court interpreting the written document 
together with the pleadings and briefs will be able to arrive at the “correct interpretation” 
more often than not.25   Here the simple comparison is between the costs of drafting and 
the costs of a trial.  A jury waiver clause is an additional element in this strategy.  Should 
a New York court deny the defendant’s claim for summary judgment (say, for example, 
on the ground that the contract language is ambiguous), the trial will proceed without a 
jury thereby reducing, by some margin, total litigation costs.   
 
The finding that jury waivers are positively correlated with New York as the 
choice of law and forum is also consistent with the hypothesis that New York, as the 
largest jurisdiction for commercial litigation in the United States, has a core of trial 
judges that, on average, have greater expertise in resolving commercial disputes.  The 
absence of a similar correlation in the case of Delaware, another prominent textualist 
jurisdiction with an expert judiciary, is explained by the fact that the jury issue is moot in 
that jurisdiction.  Indeed, our finding that Delaware is the dominant choice among merger 
partners to govern both law and forum supports the efficient cost shifting hypothesis 
since Delaware is a textualist jurisdiction with rules of interpretation similar to those in 
New York.26 
                                                 
25This argument is premised on the claim that firms behave as if they are risk neutral. Assume, for 
example, that there is a distribution of possible judicial interpretations of a particular contract.  A risk 
neutral party wants the mean of this distribution to be at the correct interpretation; that is, for the court to be 
right “on average.” Thus, risk neutral firms prefer to limit enforcement costs—say by resolving 
interpretation disputes by summary judgment—so long as the courts interpretations are correct on average.  
It follows that sophisticated parties (i.e., firms) are more reluctant to expend resources to shrink the 
variance around the correct mean.  Conditional on the quality of the court, variance falls as more evidence 
is introduced.  Thus, such parties prefer to limit the evidence that is introduced in litigation.  See Schwartz 
and Scott, 2003, 2010. 
 
26Pellaton v. Bank of New York, 592 A.2d 473 (Del. 1991) (if the instrument is clear and unambiguous on 
its face, neither this Court nor the trial court may consider parol evidence “to interpret it or search for the 
parties’ intent [ions]….”) (quoting Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 339, 343 (1983)) 





The inference that jury waivers are linked to the design choice to shift contracting 
costs from the enforcement stage to the negotiation stage is also consistent with the 
finding that jury waivers are positively correlated with more experienced merger 
attorneys with larger reputations.  More reputable firms are likely to employ transactional 
lawyers who are more familiar with the differences between textualist and contextualist 
jurisdictions and thus are better able to advise clients of the efficiency benefits of 
choosing New York as the governing law and forum together with a jury waiver 
provision.   
 
This is consistent with the finding that the positive correlation between law firm 
reputation and jury waivers is driven by New York law firms. In addition, the capacity of 
a lawyer to mount sophisticated legal arguments that are more likely to persuade a judge 
during a bench trial is increasing in the lawyer’s skill and experience and thus increasing 
in the reputation of the law firm.  Additional support for this inference is provided by the 
finding that jury waiver clauses are positively correlated with a large acquirer taking over 
a smaller target. The relative size of the acquirer is increasing in its ability, ceteris 
paribus, to bargain for a jury waiver clause both for efficiency reasons and also to negate 
any distributional advantage that might attend a small target’s ability to persuade a jury 







Table 1:  Sample Creation 
Sample Creation # of observations 
U.S. domestic mergers from SDC (2001-2011) 109,098 
No stock return data from CRSP (100,610) 
Initial Sample 8,488 
     Dropped if acquirer name equal to target name (exchange offer or “buyback”) (6,681) 
     Dropped if the form is not “merger” (. equity carve outs, loan modifications and 
recapitalizations)  (281) 
     Dropped if the merger is not filed with the SEC (268) 
     Dropped if the merger does not have a merger agreement (351) 
     Dropped mergers wherein forum clause is Delaware  (603) 
     Dropped mergers wherein relative size cannot be calculated because of missing data (28) 






Table 2: Definitions and Sources for Independent Variables 
 
Variable Definition {Source} 
Forum-NY Dummy variable set to unity if choice of forum is New York, and zero 
otherwise. {Merger agreement} 
Forum-restrictive Dummy variable set to unity if choice of forum is either Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Texas, Vermont, or  
Washington, and zero otherwise. {Merger agreement} 
  
A_reputation_PPP Rank based on profits per partner for the acquiring firm’s lawyer. Rank goes 
from high reputation [1], to low reputation [200]. If the law firm is not ranked 
we give it a rank of 201. {Merger agreement and Am Law 200 series} 
T_reputation_PPP Rank based on profits per partner for the target firm’s lawyer. Rank goes from 
high reputation [1], to low reputation [200]. If the law firm is not ranked we 
give it a rank of 201. {Merger agreement and Am Law 200 series} 
A_reputation_Vault Rank based on Vault for the acquiring firm’s lawyer. Rank goes from high 
reputation [1], to low reputation [100]. If the law firm is not ranked we give it a 
rank of 101. {Merger agreement and Vault 100 series} 
T_reputation_Vault Rank based on Vault for the target firm’s lawyer. Rank goes from high 
reputation [1], to low reputation [100]. If the law firm is not ranked we give it a 
rank of 101. {Merger agreement and Vault 100 series} 
A_reputation_NY Dummy variable set to unity if the acquiring firm’s lawyer is from New York, 
and zero otherwise. {Merger agreement} 
T_reputation_NY Dummy variable set to unity if the target firm’s lawyer is from New York, and 
zero otherwise. {Merger agreement} 
  
Lawyer familiarity Dummy variable set to unity if attorneys for both the target and acquirer firm 
are from the same state, and zero otherwise. {Merger agreement}  
A_ HQ-lawyer familiarity Dummy variable set to unity if the acquiring firm’s headquarters and the 
acquiring firm’s attorney are from the same state, and zero otherwise. {Merger 
agreement}  
T_ HQ-lawyer familiarity Dummy variable set to unity if the target firm’s headquarters and the target 
firm’s attorney are from the same state, and zero otherwise. {Merger 
agreement}  
  





market value. {CRSP} 
A_ international Dummy variable set to unity if bidder is an international acquirer, and zero 
otherwise. {SDC} 







Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Forum-NY 0.25 0 0.43 
Forum-restrictive 0.17 0 0.38 
    
A_reputation _PPP 101.85 83 80.76 
T_reputation _PPP 115.25 120 76.80 
A_reputation_Vault 63.85 89 41.14 
T_reputation_Vault 69.07 97 38.26 
A_reputation_NY 0.31 0 0.46 
T_reputation_NY 0.18 0 0.39 
    
Lawyer familiarity 0.32 0 0.47 
A_HQ- lawyer familiarity 0.84 1 0.37 
T_HQ- lawyer familiarity 0.73 1 0.45 
    
Relative size -2.17 -2.06 1.58 
A_international 0.06 0 0.23 
Completed 0.92 1 0.27 
    




















Table 4: Spearman Correlation Coefficients of Lawyer Reputation Variables 
 
   
 A_Reputation_Vault A_reputation_NY 
A_reputation _PPP 0.864 -0.572 
A_reputation _NY -0.608 
 
   
 
T_Reputation_Vault T_reputation_NY 
T_reputation _PPP 0.824 -0.535 
T_reputation _NY -0.560  
   
   







Table 5:  Probit Model for Choice of Jury Waiver Clause 
 





Ranking of Vault 
Magazine 
 Dummy for NY law 
firm 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Panel A: Regression estimates and standard errors  
 
Forum-NY  0.312 (0.10)a  0.322 (0.10)a  0.302 (0.10)a 
Forum-restrictive  -0.143 (0.11)  -0.136 (0.11)  -0.103 (0.10) 
       
A_reputation _PPP  -0.002 (0.000)a     
T_reputation _PPP  -0.001 (0.001)     
A_reputation_Vault    -0.003 (0.001)a   
T_reputation_Vault    -0.002 (0.001)b   
A_reputation_NY      0.258 (0.10)a 
T_reputation_NY      0.214 (0.11) 
       
Lawyer familiarity  -0.107 (0.08)  -0.153 (0.08)  -0.141 (0.09) 
A_HQ-lawyer familiarity  0.030 (0.11)  0.037 (0.11)  -0.003 (0.11) 
T_HQ-lawyer familiarity  -0.142 (0.09)  -0.155 (0.09)  -0.160 (0.09) 
       
Relative Size  -0.080 (0.03)a  -0.083 (0.03)a  -0.066 (0.03)a 
A_international  0.362 (0.21)  0.382 (0.21)  0.362 (0.20) 
Completed  0.074 (0.14)  0.067 (0.15)  0.032 (0.14) 
constant  0.023 (0.54)  0.284 (0.57)  -0.792 (0.48) 
       
       
Panel B: p-values for variables jointly equal to zero  
 
Forum  0.001a  0.001a  0.003b 
Attorney reputation  0.000a  0.000a  0.001a 
Lawyer familiarity  0.166  0.062  0.083 
Industry effects  0.192  0.143  0.051 
       
Pseudo R2  0.312  0.313  0.297 






See Table 2 for variable definitions. Results are for the marginal effects of each variable. For each regression 
specification, 18 industry dummies are included for acquirers and targets (nine each), the results of which are 





Table 6:  Parsimonious Probit Model of Statistically Significant Variables (in Table 5)  
 





Ranking of Vault 
Magazine 
 Dummy for NY law 
firm 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Panel A: Regression estimates and standard errors  
 
Forum-NY  0.382 (0.08)a  0.366 (0.08)a  0.369 (0.09)a 
       
A_reputation _PPP  -0.002 (0.000)a     
A_reputation_Vault    -0.003 (0.000)a   
T_reputation_Vault    -0.003 (0.001)a   
A_reputation_NY      0.330 (0.08)a 
       
       
Relative Size  -0.066 (0.02)a  -0.073 (0.02)a  -0.063 (0.02)a 
constant  -0.062 (0.19)  0.293 (0.23)  -0.845 (0.16) 
       
       
Pseudo R2  0.200  0.208  0.178 
N  276  276  276 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Results are for the marginal effects of each variable. a statistically 





Table 7:  Removing States with Chancery Courts   (AR, IL, MS, NJ, and TN)  
 





Ranking of Vault 
Magazine 
 Dummy for NY law 
firm 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Panel A: Regression estimates and standard errors  
 
Forum-NY  0.385 (0.08)a  0.367 (0.09)a  0.362 (0.09)a 
       
A_reputation _PPP  -0.002 (0.000)a     
A_reputation_Vault    -0.003 (0.000)a   
T_reputation_Vault    -0.003 (0.001)a   
A_reputation_NY      0.353 (0.08)a 
       
       
Relative Size  -0.069 (0.03)a  -0.078 (0.02)a  -0.069 (0.02)a 
constant  -0.081 (0.19)  0.301 (0.24)  -0.881 (0.17) 
       
       
Pseudo R2  0.204  0.216  0.188 
N  262  262  262 
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Results are for the marginal effects of each variable. a statistically 
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